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Abstract  
Interpretations of Russia’s military intervention in Syria overwhelmingly focus on Russia’s 
political motivations. An alternative view foregrounds Russia’s economic motivations, namely, 
the construction of a multi-billion-dollar gas pipeline traversing Iran, Iraq and Syria. This 
article examines the salience of Russia’s economic motivations and considers two related 
aspects: First, if Russian intervention aims to secure areas of strategic importance for the 
proposed pipeline. Second, if Russian intervention realises longer term political and 
commercial interests that include proposed future pipeline projects. The evidence suggests 
Russian military policies towards Syria are unlikely to be motivated primarily by the prospect 
of a proposed gas pipeline, but that regime consolidation is a more immediate policy goal. This 
article then posits that Russian intervention has a distinct ‘dual logic’ aimed at integrating the 
interests of key regional actors into a transnational energy network, while stabilising Russia’s 
regional dominance within this network.   
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Introduction 
This article explores Russia’s motivations to militarily intervene in Syria. Hitherto, 
explanations have focused on the political incentives for Russia’s support of the Syrian 
government, particularly Russian attempts to consolidate the Syrian regime for reasons of 
regional stability and global power considerations. The potential impact of economic 
motivations has been largely overlooked in scholarly analyses. However, an emerging narrative 
has foregrounded the importance of economic incentives related to natural resources. More 
specifically, this narrative has focused on competing multi-billion-dollar gas pipeline projects 
that are planned to traverse Syria, namely, a Russian-backed Iranian pipeline (known as the 
Islamic Pipeline) vis-à-vis a US-backed Qatari pipeline, both planned to transport gas to 
lucrative European markets.  
This economic narrative is largely limited to speculative opinion pieces (albeit from 
respectable sources) and is yet to be subjected to rigorous academic investigation. As such, this 
article aims to contribute to the debate by investigating the salience of Russia’s economic 
motivations in Syria and unpacking how these motivations can interact with Russia’s political 
goals. By combining disaggregate-level data on Russian airstrikes with documentary evidence 
and conceptual arguments, we first aim to expand on the current literature by exploring if 
Russia has intervened to secure short-term economic gains, namely to secure a corridor for the 
construction of a particular pipeline. The evidence suggests that Russia has not primarily 
intervened to secure the construction of the Islamic Pipeline and therefore suggests that 
accounts foregrounding the importance of gas pipelines are too economically reductionist to 
fully appreciate Russia’s motivations in Syria. Nevertheless, we argue that long-term economic 
explanations cannot be separated from political factors that have figured prominently in the 
majority of analyses of Russian intervention. In order to shed light on the nexus between 
3 
 
political factors and long-term economic interests, we argue that regime consolidation can be 
linked to an economic logic and that a more nuanced understanding of the interplay between 
Russia’s political and long-term economic motivations provides insights into Russia’s key 
motivating factors leading to military intervention.  
This article therefore argues that regime consolidation is integral to Russia’s longer-
term political and commercial interests that have as much to do with regional pipeline security 
as with structural energy dynamics on a regional and global level. To further develop this 
argument, this paper draws on Doug Stokes’ concept of a ‘dual logic’ applied to US foreign 
policy. This concept demonstrates how US military interventions in oil-rich countries can serve 
both US national interests and, at the same time, transnationalise those interests by securing oil 
supplies for the US-led, liberal global economy more generally. In this article, we aim to further 
contribute to the debate by arguing that Russia’s intervention in Syria serves a similar but 
distinct ‘dual logic’. While providing specific insights into and the nexus between Russian 
foreign policy, energy interests and military intervention, this also contributes to broader 
theoretical and conceptual debates within Politics and International Relations that are currently 
understudied. More specifically, the analysis hopes to nuance IR debates about global 
‘hegemony’ by focusing on decentred ‘transnationalisation’ practices relating to politico-
economic interests that also take place at the inter-regional level.  
By consolidating the Syrian regime, Russia’s goals serve the interests of other actors in 
the region that are not aligned to the US-led liberal global order (in this instance, Syria and 
Iran), whilst simultaneously bolstering Russia’s national interests as a leading supplier of 
global energy. Russia’s intervention in Syria provides Russian influence and oversight of the 
supply of energy to the EU and facilitates Russia’s position as a dominant energy supplier that 
also controls distribution networks. In the Syrian context, Russian intervention is therefore 
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conducive to longer-term political and commercial interests that may include, inter alia, 
proposed future pipeline projects.  
 
Explanations for Russian intervention in Syria 
From the onset of Syria’s armed conflict in 2011, Russia has provided active diplomatic and 
political support for president Bashar al-Assad’s government and power infrastructure, voting 
down any resolution in the UN Security Council that could be construed to justify a military 
intervention of Assad’s external opponents, and sending advisers to Damascus to counsel the 
Syrian authorities on policy planning (Trenin, 2018). On 30 September 2015, the Russian air 
force then started to provide cover for Syrian regime forces and Hezbollah to re-take previously 
held opposition areas at a time when Assad’s forces were on the defensive (Oweis, 2016: 3). 
Explanations of Russian intervention have focused on numerous factors but have nevertheless 
concentrated on political motives. Various scholarship foregrounds the instrumentality of Syria 
in a broader Russian attempt to re-define its role as a global actor and co-equal of the United 
States, as well as Russia’s foreign policy towards Syria in the wider systemic context of global 
order (Trenin, 2013, 2015; Charap, 2013; Averre and Davies, 2015; Tsygankov, 2015; Stent, 
2016; Pieper, 2019).  
Importantly, this scholarship has extrapolated from likely country-specific explanations 
for Russian policies towards Syria to the ‘bigger picture’ of global politics without which an 
isolated in-country analysis risks becoming ahistorical. Trenin (2013) and Pieper (2019) have 
argued that such a position is not to be mistaken for principled obstructionism, but is seen as a 
policy to indicate the inevitability of Russia as a dialogue partner of the West in wider questions 
of security governance. Averre and Davies (2015) strike a similar chord, explaining Russia’s 
diplomatic and political cover for the Syrian regime as motivated by Russian concerns over the 
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erosion of bedrock principles of international law. Their analysis focuses on Russia’s stance on 
humanitarian interventions and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) in particular, which 
Moscow reads as a potentially dangerous pretext to violate the principle of Sovereign Equality 
among states. Yet, they point out that Russia’s resistance to the invocation of ‘R2P’ on a UN 
level in the Syrian case is not due to its opposition to the idea of humanitarian assistance per 
se, but due to substantive reservations regarding its implementation (p. 814). Krickovic and 
Weber (2018) interpret Russia’s intervention in Syria as an illustration of a ‘bargaining 
problem’ over the future of the international order and Moscow’s willingness to assert its status 
as an influential great power.   
With varying degrees of support for the idea that strong partnerships with states in the 
Middle East have intrinsic value for the Russian government, a number of other Russia 
observers share the assessment that Russia’s involvement in Syria can be explained by an 
ambition to re-confirm Russia’s power standing on par with the Unites States, especially in the 
wake of attempts by Western governments to isolate Russia for its role in the Ukraine crisis of 
2014 (Karaganov, 2013; Kozhanov, 2016). Baev (2015) interprets Russia’s greater 
involvement in Middle Eastern affairs as an effort not only to send policy signals to the West, 
and the US in particular, but as a pronounced desire to ‘prove its value to China as a strategic 
partner’ (p. 8). According to this perspective, Russia’s ‘return’ to the Middle East, following 
its retreat from the region after the implosion of the Soviet Union, would also signal a new 
willingness to shape future regional orders at a time when the US has begun a gradual retreat 
from the Middle East.  
Others have focused on questions of regional order. By protecting the Syrian 
government from opposing armed forces, this would, for example, avoid the emergence of 
radical Islamists, which in turn would create a vacuum of instability south of the Caucasus 
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(Souleimanov, 2016: 112; Treisman, 2012). There is an inherent contradiction in this argument, 
however, as Russia’s intervention arguably served to radicalise also the Russian and Central 
Asian ‘foreign fighters’ who had flocked to Syria (Ratelle, 2016). In this light, in contrast to 
Russia’s self-proclaimed aim of fighting terrorism in Syria, the core motivation for Russian 
intervention is argued to be its pursuit of protecting (both politically and militarily) its key ally 
in the region at all costs, with Russia targeting not only those groups considered terrorist but 
also the more moderate rebels (Notte, 2016; Hill, 2013). Regime consolidation is therefore 
considered to be the core reason explaining why Russia has taken military action in Syria, 
protecting the then embattled Syrian regime from falling to armed opposition. Relatedly, 
Allison (2013) has made the argument that an externally enforced regime change in Syria 
would have sent negative signals for political stability even within Russia domestically. 
Finally, Freire and Heller (2018) have analysed the international and domestic signalling 
effects of Russian victories abroad in the pursuit of Russian ‘status-seeking’, likewise arguing 
that both internal and external dynamics led Russia to use coercion as a way of improving its 
international status. Connolly (2016) further notes that Russia’s use of counter-sanctions and 
import-substitution strategies in the wake of the Ukraine crisis led to an overall 'securitisation' 
of economic policy in Russia. The Syrian intervention has further accentuated the link between 
foreign policy and perceptions of domestic economic performance (Wasser, 2019: 2). 
 
Gas and gas pipelines 
Notwithstanding Russia’s domestic economic issues, what is largely missing from this body of 
literature is an appreciation of possible economic motives that underlay Russia’s decision to 
intervene militarily in Syria. The significance of the Tartus naval facility in Syria, while 
Russia’s only port access outside of the borders of the Russian Federation, lay in its usefulness 
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for troop supplies, yet does not on its own constitute a sufficient reason to intervene militarily 
(Allison, 2013: 807). An emerging narrative has instead focused on the issue of proposed gas 
pipelines in Syria as a way of understanding foreign intervention in the country, which has 
been developed in addition to the literature discussed above, but has lacked thorough empirical 
testing, as we will explore further below. News outlets such as Al Jazeera and the UK Guardian 
have carried stories that oil and gas interests are central factor for understanding foreign 
intervention in Syria (Escobar, 2012; Ahmed, 2013). Similarly, Think Tanks including the 
Washington Institute, as well as opinion pieces from outlets such as Foreign Affairs, Politico 
and The Globe and Mail, have foregrounded the centrality of natural resources and the related 
infrastructure to understanding Russian policy and intervention in Syria (Orenstein and Romer, 
2015; Kennedy, 2016; Gordon, 2017; Sogoloff, 2017; Koduvayur and Everett, 2019; Korotkov, 
2020). 
Central to such narratives is the importance of natural gas and gas-related infrastructure 
in Syria, more specifically, the planned future construction of a $10 billion gas pipeline 
traversing Iran, Iraq, and Syria. If built, this pipeline (commonly referred to as the Islamic 
Pipeline) would run from the Iranian Port Assalouyeh near the South Pars gas field in the 
Persian Gulf, then traverse Iraq and cross Syria through the governorates of (east to west) Deir 
ez-Zor, Homs and Tartus. The pipeline would make Syria the centre of assembly and 
production, before gas would be transported to the market via Lebanon as well as Baniyas, 
Syria. An agreement between the governments of Syria, Iran, and Iraq to build the pipeline was 
signed in July 2011, shortly after the outbreak of Syria’s civil war (Hafidh and Faucon, 2011). 
This was largely unnoticed by international observers as the Saudi, Qatari, and Western 
governments had begun to join efforts to remove Assad from power at that time. The Islamic 
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Pipeline challenges a previous gas pipeline project that was proposed by the Qatari government 
in 2009.1  
This pipeline, purportedly rejected by the Assad government in the interests of its 
Russian ally, would run from Qatar’s North Field through Syrian territory to Turkey for further 
exportation into the EU. This gas-pipeline narrative further focuses on Russia’s preference for 
the Islamic Pipeline when compared to the Qatari-proposed project, given Russia’s more 
favourable links with Iran when compared to Qatar. This could be instrumental for Russia to 
control gas exports to Europe from the region, where Russia is the primary supplier of solid 
fuels, crude oil and natural gas to lucrative EU markets.  
In this light, this article argues that while Syria is not a major global producer of oil and 
gas, it is nevertheless strategically important for future supplies to EU markets, which will 
remain Russia’s core energy export market for the foreseeable future. This is particularly 
important given that, although Russia’s ‘turn to the East’ (povorot na Vostok) has forged new 
energy links with China, the obstacles facing Sino-Russian energy relations relating to logistics 
as much as commercial preferences (Baev, 2016) mean that Russia is unlikely to be able to 
replace the crucial EU markets with Chinese customers as part of its energy diversification 
strategies. It is therefore safe to presume that Russia will continue to view its EU markets as 
both politically and economically crucial to its wider energy security policies. This includes 
issues relating to the supply of resources to EU markets, including the construction of key 
infrastructure such as the Islamic Pipeline, with clear signs, according to some sources, that by 
2019 the pipeline was going ahead (Watkins, 2019). Investing political, military and financial 
capital in Syria’s energy infrastructure, in this light, is a policy to preserve Russia’s imprint on 
 
1 For a sceptical view of the pertinence of gas pipelines in explaining Russian intervention in Syria, see Butter, 
2015.  
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any future regional energy distribution network, even if this will remain largely geared towards 
European markets.  
Has Russia intervened militarily to secure pipeline construction? 
A key point to first discuss is how central the issue of gas pipelines is in the Syrian case and to 
discuss if Russian intervention is primarily linked to the Islamic pipeline plans announced in 
2011. What is largely missing from this narrative is that it is feasible – in fact, it is rather 
common – for natural resource extraction and transportation to occur in conflict zones, 
including the initiation and completion of major infrastructure projects during protracted armed 
conflicts such as civil wars. In this light, rather than securing an entire country, it is common 
for armed actors to secure and stabilise particular areas of strategic importance within a country 
to enable the development of major infrastructural projects such as oil and gas pipelines. For 
example, by targeting rebel groups (and often civilians) in areas of strategic importance, 
governments and pro-government militias are able to protect both existing and proposed 
pipeline infrastructure from the instability of, say, rebel attacks. By expanding territorial 
control, military action creates ‘buffer zones’ to protect existing infrastructure and enables the 
construction of major infrastructural projects during armed conflict. Furthermore, overall levels 
of violence within civil wars typically increase during this period of territorial expansion, 
particularly as opposed armed groups intensify their own military campaigns to challenge this 
territorial expansion. However, armed actors sympathetic to oil and gas interests push the 
violence away from areas of strategic importance and provide a particular form a “stability” 
and “security” in areas of economic interest (Maher, 2018; see also Stokes and Raphael, 2010). 
This includes providing security for existing infrastructure but also for the construction of 
major new infrastructural projects linked to the extractive industries (e.g., Maher, 2018).  
Relatedly, there is a common observation that many natural resource extracting firms enter 
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civil war economies as security and stability can be provided for their interests. As FitzGerald 
(2001: 209) notes, some Transnational Corporations (TNCs) are established investors in 
countries with conflicts and ‘operating in conflict situations could be said to be an integral part 
of corporate culture for natural resource firms’. Moreover, Luciani’s (2011) research suggests 
that oil and gas installations are more resilient to armed conflict than is commonly assumed, 
with major damage to infrastructure a rare occurrence. 
With these points in mind, disaggregated conflict data – as the analysis below employs 
– can provide a better understanding of the dynamics of a particular conflict and the political 
and economic consequences of violence. In the Syrian case, if the construction of the Islamic 
Pipeline is the primary motivation for Russian intervention in Syria, we should expect to see 
Russian airstrikes to secure and ’clear’ these areas of threats to the proposed pipeline. However, 
if Russian intervention is aimed at regime consolidation, we should expect airstrikes to target 
areas in which the Syrian government faces its toughest challenges from armed actors, 
regardless of whether these areas are strategically important for the Islamic Pipeline.  
There is little evidence to suggest that Russian intervention is specifically designed to 
secure territorial control in areas of strategic importance for the proposed oil pipeline. The first 
observation to note is the timing of Russian intervention such as airstrikes. With the 
announcement of the Islamic Pipeline in July 2011, it is unclear why Russia would wait until 
30 September 2015 to begin airstrikes in Syria if the proposed pipeline was its central concern. 
As Figure 1 shows, Russia embarked on an intensive campaign of airstrikes between October 
2015 and February 2016 (for information on this data and the timeframe analysed, see 
Appendix 1). Furthermore, the intensity of Russian strikes peaked in January 2016 and 
February 2016. This represents an increased military effort before the Russian government 
publicly announced its first withdrawal order in March 2016 (Kozhanov, 2016). The 
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strengthening of the Syrian government’s control over previously contested areas was therefore 
given as a rationale for Putin ordering the retreat of the Russian armed forces beginning on 15 
March 2016 (Russian Foreign Ministry, 2016).  
Figure 1. Russian airstrikes (with ‘fair’ level of reporting), September 2015 to April 2016 
 
Source: Airwars (n.d.) 
 
 
The second observation is that Russian airstrikes do not coincide with the trajectory of 
the proposed pipeline, which would run from east to west, via Deir ez-Zor, Homs and Tartus. 
As noted, if Russian airstrikes were primarily concerned with stabilising and securing particular 
regions of Syria to facilitate the construction of the Islamic Pipeline, we would expect to see 
high levels of airstrikes target these areas. However, as Figure 2 shows, while it is true that the 
data show Deir ez-Zor (13% of total airstrikes) and Homs (13%) recorded the third and fourth 
highest levels of airstrikes, it is nevertheless Aleppo (44%) and Idlib (15%) that experienced 
the highest numbers of airstrikes between September 2015 and April 2016. Rather than 
representing areas of strategic importance for the gas pipeline, both Aleppo (44%) and Idlib 
(15%) were strongholds of anti-Assad forces posing a significant and direct challenge to the 
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Assad government. In terms of location, these four governates (Aleppo, Idlib, Deir ez-Zor and 
Homs) constitute 85% of total Russian airstrikes. 
  
Figure 2. Russian airstrikes (with ‘fair’ level of reporting) by governorate, September 2015 to 
April 2016 
Source: Airwars (n.d.) 
 
Russian support for regime consolidation  
Figure 3 and Table 1 further suggest that Russian airstrikes were aimed at consolidation 
of the Syrian regime. Russian airstrikes heavily targeted Aleppo between October 2015 and 
March 2016, with Russian airstrikes in Aleppo intensifying in January and February 2016, 
targeting a number of opposition forces regardless of their proximity to proposed gas pipelines. 
While Russian intervention was broadly criticised for largely targeting non-IS (Islamic State) 
opposition groups, the airstrikes during January and February 2016 increasingly targeted IS 
(e.g., Casagrande, 2016; The Carter Center, 2016: 3). Indeed, between 25 January 2016 and 7 
February 2016, Russian intervention systematically targeted numerous opposition forces in 
Aleppo, including Russian military action targeted at IS controlled territory in North-eastern 
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Aleppo and east of Aleppo City (Casagrande, 2016: n.p.; The Carter Center, 2016: 3). This 
included significant victories for the Assad government in Aleppo, situating the government in 
a strong negotiating position at the UN-sponsored Geneva Talks aimed at ending the Syrian 
conflict (Casagrande, 2016: n.p.).  
Figure 3. Number of Russian airstrikes (with ‘fair’ level of reporting) by month in Aleppo, 
Idlib, Homs and Deir ez-Zor  
 
Source: Airwars (n.d.) 
 
 
Table 1. Number of Russian airstrikes (with ‘fair’ level of reporting) by month in Aleppo, 
Idlib, Homs and Deir ez-Zor 
 
Sep-
15 
Oct-
15 
Nov-
15 
Dec-
15 
Jan-
16 
Feb-
16 
Mar-
16 
Apr-
16 Total 
% of 
total 
Aleppo  0 22 22 25 45 62 10 1 187 44% 
Idlib  1 17 18 11 12 5 0 1 65 15% 
Deir ez-Zor  0 0 2 6 30 11 3 2 54 13% 
Homs  4 8 8 7 5 13 9 0 54 13% 
Total 5 47 50 49 92 91 22 4 360  
Source: Airwars (n.d.) 
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During this period, Russian airstrikes also focused on opposition-held territory in north-
western Aleppo Province, to support the Syrian government’s offensive to disrupt the primary 
opposition ground line of communication from Aleppo to the Syrian-Turkish border 
(Casagrande, 2016: n.p.). During January 2016, Russian airstrikes also hit a number of targets 
in southern Aleppo, coinciding with a pro-government ground offensive to retake Aleppo City, 
which succeeded on 26 January 2016 (The Carter Center, 2016: 2). Russian airstrikes also 
bolstered Kurdish forces in Aleppo, including the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (an 
alliance made of Kurdish People’s Projection Units, or YPG, and other armed rebel groups), 
who were able to take control of at least three villages near the rebel-held border town of Azaz. 
Furthermore, what has been referred to as the ‘Northern Aleppo Offensive’ (Tokmajyan, 2016) 
began on 1 February 2016 and involved intensive Russian airstrikes to support the Syrian army 
and its allies (namely, Hezbollah, as well as Iraqi and Afghan Shia militias) to advance in 
northern Aleppo towards the towns of Nubbul and al-Zahra, facing opposition from the Islamic 
Front, al-Jabha ash-Shamiyeh (The Levant Front) and Fatah Halab. It is estimated to have taken 
three days for the Syrian government to gain control of those towns, with the fighting 
continuing until 15 February as the regime consolidated its gains (Tokmajyan, 2016).  
Russian airstrikes during January and February 2016 further aimed to sever one of two 
key opposition supply lines into Aleppo City from the Turkish border and encircle opposition-
held sections of Aleppo City (Casagrande, 2016: n.p). In Aleppo, Russian airstrikes have also 
enabled pro-government forces to expand their territorial control in southern Aleppo, as well 
as eastern Aleppo and areas surrounding the besieged Kweiris military airbase which the Syrian 
government aimed to relieve (The Carter Center, 2016: 4). Airstrikes resumed in September 
2016 to aid the Assad government in its offensive on Aleppo (BBC, 2016b) and, by December 
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2016, Assad was able to pronounce the ‘liberation’ of Aleppo thanks to intensive Russian 
military aerial support (RT, 2016).2  
Furthermore, rebel gains in the Idlib, Hama and Latakia governorates had threatened to 
cut off Damascus (Assad’s seat of government) from the coast. With the help of Russian 
firepower, as well as ground support from Iran and Hezbollah, Assad’s forces managed to seal 
off rebel areas in Idlib, Aleppo and Hama. In late December 2015, a Syrian ground offensive 
backed by Russian airstrikes made territorial gains in the Dara’a governorate in the South after 
previous assaults had targeted mostly Northern governorates (Reuters, 2015b). Russia’s 
bombing campaign, in addition, helped disperse rebel groups from the Latakia region in early 
2016 (BBC, 2016a). Russian airstrikes have thus fought anti-Assad forces in the Idlib, Homs, 
Hama, and Aleppo governorates, but also in the South (Dara’a) and the East (Deir ez-Zor, al-
Hasakah).  
Figure 3 and Table 1 also show the increased targeting of Idlib in October and 
November 2015. This was strategically relevant for the Syrian government, as the loss of Idlib 
to a rebel offensive in the first half of 2015 had been considered a strategic defeat for Assad 
(Al Jazeera, 2015). Before September 2015, Assad had been on the defensive due to advances 
by the Western-backed FSA and the Army of Conquest. Russian airstrikes in the Idlib 
governorate in late November 2015 were intended to turn the tables in favour of Assad’s ground 
forces to retake towns like Ariha, which had fallen to the Army of Conquest six months before 
(Al Jazeera, 2015). 
To our knowledge, there are no other available datasets that can be used to corroborate 
the disaggregated Airwars data during the September 2015-April 2016 period. However, the 
 
2 No airstrikes were recorded in Tartus, which was already is under government control and hosts Russia’s naval 
facility. 
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ACLED dataset (Raleigh et al., 2010) records data on Russian intervention in Syria between 
2017 and 2019 (see Appendix 2). The data support the observations above, suggesting that 
Russian airstrikes were employed to consolidate the position of the Syrian government. As 
Figure 4 shows, the majority of air/drone strikes with Russian involvement occurred in Idlib 
(51% of the total), followed by Hama (25%) and Aleppo (9%). According to ACLED’s data, 
while neither Idlib nor Hama are strategically important for the Islamic Pipeline, the majority 
(85%) of airstrikes/drone attacks involving the Russian government occurred in these 
governorates (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Count of air/drone strikes with Russian involvement in Syria, 2017-2019 
  
Source: Raleigh et al. 2010 
 
 
To summarise, the majority of Russian airstrikes between September 2015 and April 
2016 were targeted at Aleppo, followed by Idlib, indicating that Russia’s motivation to fly 
airstrikes in support of an Assad government retaking territory previously lost to rebel factions. 
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Between 2017 and 2019, ACLED’s data similarly suggest that Russia targeted regions where 
rebel groups had previously made military gains, with the highest count of air/drone strikes 
recorded in the governorates of Idlib and Hama. Russian air forces have struck in those areas 
where anti-Assad forces had made significant territorial gains and posed a significant challenge 
to the Syrian government prior to Russia’s intervention. While Russia was claiming to be 
waging an anti-IS campaign (TASS, 2015), Russian airstrikes have targeted any anti-Assad 
group that posed a broader threat to the Syria state rather than targeting groups threatening 
strategically important areas for the proposed Islamic Pipeline. This includes targeting groups 
such as IS, the al-Nusra front (later rebranded to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham), the Islamic Front’s 
Jaysh al-Islam, Liwa al-Haqq, the ‘Chechen fighters’ to the Saudi- and Turkish-backed ‘Army 
of Conquest’ (Jaysh al-Fatah) and the Free Syrian Army. Russian airstrikes have also provided 
the aerial support for regime forces and Hezbollah on the ground to re-gain territorial control 
over those areas where Assad had been on the back foot (Oweis, 2016: 3). Russian airstrikes 
have proved to be a game-changer in favour of the Syrian government. With Assad firmly back 
in the saddle, Russia’s policy goal of regime consolidation has been largely achieved. 
Understanding Russian intervention through a ‘Dual Logic’ lens 
While the evidence above suggests avoiding economically reductionist accounts of 
Russian foreign policy towards Syria, Russia’s pursuit of regime consolidation nevertheless 
has both political and economic motivations. To investigate the interplay between these 
motivations, we draw on the work of Stokes (2007) and Stokes and Raphael (2010), arguing 
that the lens of a ‘dual logic’ that has been applied to US foreign intervention in resource-rich 
areas can serve as a useful analogy to understand Russian intervention in Syria. Stokes (2007) 
argues that US intervention is underpinned by a ‘dual logic’, whereby: (i) US primacy in oil-
rich regions stabilises energy supplies for global capitalism within the US-led, liberal, open 
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market global political economy, benefitting other core powers; and (ii) US intervention 
simultaneously maintains US primacy over these same core powers. Thus, the dual logic is 
based on (i) a transnational logic whereby the US government has aimed to maintain an open 
global economy that enables core powers and actors of globalised capital (for instance, 
transnational corporations) to participate while (ii) the US government has simultaneously 
aimed to pursue and secure its own national interests (Stokes and Raphael, 2010: 15). In this 
light, the US government’s strategy to transnationalise the oil-rich Global South is in fact a 
strategy to further cement the US’ global hegemony (Stokes and Raphael, 2010: 2).  
The US further consolidates this position by acting as the ‘ultimate guarantor of global energy 
security’, with US foreign policy aimed at maintaining and defending an economically liberal 
international system that is conducive to capital penetration and circulation (Stokes and 
Raphael, 2010: 2). The US derives enormous structural power through its role of playing the 
‘cop on the beat’ where social forces (e.g., democratic, nationalist or Islamist) pose a threat to 
the stability of generic interests of core powers (Stokes, 2007: 252). Thus, the US state has 
tried to ‘armour’ processes of transnationalization and globalization by using coercive 
statecraft (Stokes and Raphael, 2010: 2-3). President Trump’s comments that he left behind US 
troops in Syria ‘only for the oil’ and that the US was ‘keeping the oil’ following his earlier 
withdrawal announcement on 6 October 2019 serve as an unvarnished illustration of this 
reading – as a blunt demonstration of US global interests in the energy-security nexus, stripped 
of the discursive edifice that critical IR scholarship has been working to deconstruct for decades 
(Borger, 2019).  
While the US and other core states benefit from a global political economy consisting 
of more players in each market and competitive pricing – and while having diversity of supply 
and a competitive landscape where suppliers compete with one another is in the interest of 
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resource importing countries – the story is different for resource exporting countries. In 
contrast, resource exporting countries often complain that the trading system is biased against 
them: as the exports these countries sell on the international market are priced at highly 
competitive rates, the goods that these countries import are commonly sold in oligopolistic 
markets, resulting in unfavorable terms of trade (Jaffe and Soligo, 2009: 112-3).  
Since the 2000s, Russia has increasingly challenged the US dual logic outlined above. 
While the 1990s saw privatisations in Russia’s own energy sector, the 2000s saw a 
renationalisation of key sections of the energy sector (Jaffe and Soligo, 2009: 123). In terms of 
gas, state-owned Gazprom enjoys a quasi-monopoly in the production and transport of gas and, 
with the exception of the Azerbaijan to Turkey BTC pipeline, Russia controls access of Caspian 
resources to export markets due to Russia’s lock on regional pipeline networks (Jaffe and 
Soligo, 2009: 119). As a large state-owned company, Gazprom thus increases Russia’s relative 
state power ‘based on proportion of world reserves, production, and imports into Europe’ 
(Barkonov, 2018: 138). 
The following section will expand on the argument that Russian intervention – like that 
of the US – is underpinned by a distinct dual logic that is underpinned by (1) a transnational 
logic aimed at securing the interests of states not aligned to the US-led liberal order (in this 
case, Syria and Iran) but which (2) has Russia’s own national (and energy security) interests at 
its core. In this way, Russian foreign policy in Syria is less about protecting an ally from 
terrorist groups (although, Russian intervention has clearly had this effect) and more about 
securing Russian foreign policy interests underpinned by a political and economic rationale 
that is based on both transnational and national motives. 
Regime consolidation and Russia’s economic benefits 
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While there is little evidence to support the argument that Russian intervention is 
primarily about gas pipelines in Syria, an economic logic must not be overlooked and can be 
linked to political motivations such as regime consolidation. This includes the idea that future 
gas pipelines in Syria provide some explanatory power but only when Russia’s longer-term 
strategies are considered.  
Russian intervention in Syria helps pave the ground for post-war dividends that should 
provide both short-term and long-term commercial opportunities.3 This may include having 
future gas transportation through potential Syrian pipelines being firmly under the auspices and 
influence of the Russian state. Russia’s political alliance with the Assad regime and its military 
support for it is also likely to translate into revenues for the Russian state as Russia’s energy 
firms invest in Syria, such as Gazprom’s investments in new Syrian gas fields: Following 
Assad’s significant gains with the decisive help of Russian intervention, Russia’s energy 
companies hope to renew and expand their investments in Syria’s energy sector, particularly 
to rebuild and operate Syrian oil and gas infrastructure, with the hope to ‘control significant 
portions of pipelines, liquefaction facilities, refineries, and terminals’ and therefore 
‘capitalizing on Syria’s potential as a transit hub for regional oil and gas heading to Europe’ 
(Sogoloff, 2017: n.p.). In January 2018, Russian and Syrian agencies signed a two-year 
roadmap for cooperation on energy power. The agreement envisages Russia rebuilding energy 
facilities in Syria, but also the construction of new facilities based on an agreement that grants 
Russia exclusive rights for oil and gas extraction in Syria for the next 49 years (Mamedov and 
Shmeleva, 2019: 16-17, 20-21). Relatedly, others have pointed to Russia’s hope of absorbing 
a sizable percentage of the estimated $350 billion needed for Syria’s reconstruction (Vohra, 
2019).  
 
3 Russian officials have also indicated that they consider Russia’s Syria campaign to be easily affordable, 
regarding it as a small-scale military operation overall (Recknagel, 2015).  
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Russia’s considerable investment of capital (political, diplomatic, military, reputational 
and otherwise) in the future of Syrian politics acquires a tangible economic dimension to 
further augment revenues to compensate for Russia’s military expenditure in Syria and realise 
longer-term economic opportunities: Gas prices on a global level are in large part determined 
by the amount of energy released onto the world market, but deliveries are highly dependent 
on existing pipelines between suppliers and customers (Weber, 2018: 103). Russia’s continued 
ties to Syrian state structures secure it leverage power over these dynamics if Russian 
companies were to have assets in the exploration and operation of Syrian gas fields. Russian 
politicians are reportedly expecting economic rewards for Russia’s intervention in support of 
the Assad government. For instance, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin noted 
that Russia had ‘a moral right to expect financial returns from its efforts to liberate Syria from 
terrorists’, adding that ‘the Syrian authorities want to work with Russia, and Russia alone, to 
re-establish all of the country’s energy capacities’ (Khatib and Sinjab, 2018: 24). Furthermore, 
according to Khatib and Sinjab (2018: 21), Russia is ‘seeking to reshape Syrian state 
institutions to guarantee long-lasting loyalty to Moscow’, with Russia holding the ‘upper hand 
in its relationship with Syria’ following Russian military intervention, without which the Syrian 
government would have been unable to regain its military ascendancy in the country. In a 
similar light, Russia’s support for the Assad government – which has evolved from political 
and non-military means such as vetoing numerous UN Security Council resolutions deemed 
inimical to the Syrian government, to supplying war matériel, to direct military intervention – 
has served to ‘bound Syria closely to Moscow’s agenda’, with the Syrian government, while 
not exclusively obeying Russian orders, nevertheless finding itself ‘in no position to roll back 
Russia’s increasing military influence over the Syrian state’ (Khatib and Sinjab, 2018: 21). 
Russian (as well as Iranian) influence has led to a ‘hollowing out of the Syrian state’ with 
Russia’s strategy focused on keeping Syria’s state institutions strong but loyal Russia, even if 
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this requires reshaping those institutions (Khatib and Sinjab, 2018: 23). The evidence of this is 
becoming apparent. For example, in 2019, Syria’s parliament approved contracts for two 
Russian firms (identified as Mercury LLC and Velada LLC) to explore for oil and gas 
exploration in three blocs (Reuters, 2019). According to Ali Ghanem – Syria’s Minister of 
Petroleum and Mineral Resources – giving the contracts to these firms was in line with Syria’s 
strategy ‘towards friendly states that stood by Syria, with Russia and Iran at the forefront’ 
(Reuters, 2019: n.p.). The Syrian government also reportedly granted Russian companies 
participating in energy projects in Syria a ‘most favoured nation’ status that includes favourable 
tax and customs exemptions (Mamedov and Shmeleva, 2019: 17).  
In addition, Russian-sponsored Syrian government forces, as well as the presence of 
privately contracted Russian mercenaries, see to the physical protection of these interests. It 
has been reported that Russian mercenaries, hired by a private military contractor known as 
Wagner, are fighting alongside official Syrian government forces (Vasileya, 2017). Their 
presence has been debated more publicly following the death of Russian irregular fighters by 
US airstrikes near Deir Ez-Zor in February 2018 (Murtasin, 2018). And even though difficult 
to authenticate, media reports have circulated a contract according to which a Moscow-
registered front company for mercenary operations in Syria ‘would receive 25 percent of the 
proceeds from oil and gas production at fields its contractors capture and secure from Islamic 
State militants’ (Vasilyeva, 2017; see also Marten 2019: 191). Raphael and Stokes (2011: 915) 
have found a similar logic at play when analysing US policies towards West African oil, where 
the sponsorship of infrastructure projects and the establishment of ‘forward operating 
locations’ (FOLs) constitutes a combination of economic and military policies to pacify 
potential competitors by acting as a ‘hegemonic stabiliser’. In the Syrian case, Russian 
companies would thus be in an advantageous position regarding the reconstruction of Syrian 
energy facilities. The presence of big state-owned Russian energy companies translates into 
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leverage for the Russian government in Syria’s political environment. This, of course, will be 
preconditioned on the post-war reconstruction of Syria’s infrastructure, to which President 
Putin has been urging European governments to contribute (Ramani, 2019). Especially given 
Russian budgetary constraints, the market entry of Russian companies is conditioned on foreign 
direct investments in Syria.    
Transnationalising energy interests 
If Russian intervention can contribute to the moulding of Syrian policies, then support 
for Assad translates into a structural benefit for the Russian state. The long-term paradox that 
arises from Russian support of a proposed pipeline sponsored by Iran, an energy competitor, 
can be understood in terms of, on the one hand, the positive-sum nature of this support for the 
stability of regional gas exploration while, on the other hand, this support has Russian interests 
at its core. The construction of either pipeline – including the Islamic Pipeline – would 
represent additional competition for Europe-bound Russian gas, so it appears counter-intuitive 
that the realisation of any of these projects should be in Russia’s interests.  
With few resources to invest in energy exploration, Iran has suffered from years of 
international sanctions regimes imposed over its nuclear dispute. The conclusion of the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (or JCPOA, the nuclear accord of July 2015) and the beginning 
of the implementation phase from January 2016, opened the way for Iran’s return to the 
international energy markets, as UN-mandated sanctions were lifted. In this light, while Iran 
represents a partner for Russia to challenge US order conceptions for the region, it is also true 
that Iran’s return to global energy markets increases the competition for the same (European) 
markets. Nevertheless, besides Russia’s structural leverage via control over energy distribution 
networks, Moscow knows that European companies tend to ‘over-comply’ with US financial 
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sanctions that remain in place (Pieper, 2016). Iran’s rise as an energy competitor is therefore 
far from realistic.  
Five years earlier, the Iranian project had to be put into perspective of the rival Qatari 
pipeline projects, as well as shareholder dynamics: Russia’s preference for the Iranian-
sponsored gas pipeline was one that pits an informal gas alliance of Russia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria 
against an informal rival gas consortium between Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the US. 
Indeed, a senator in the Russian Federation Council and member of the Committee for 
International Affairs stated that the Iran pipeline project would be more favourable for Russia, 
but the economic considerations are rendered secondary by the ongoing war.4 A Russian energy 
alignment (however informal and despite potential rivalry in other economic sectors) with Iran, 
Iraq, and Syria, bolstered with active military support since 2015, would have helped to 
transnationalise Russian energy interests.  
By forcibly preserving its military presence in Syria while contributing to a political 
consolidation which enhances regional (energy) interconnections at the same time, Russia’s 
political and economic support in the region, including military intervention that has been 
crucial to the survival of the Syrian government, enables Russia to take a leading role in 
regional energy politics. This bolsters Russian primacy within the aforementioned informal 
energy alliance in the region. Investing in new gas pipelines in which Russian state-owned 
energy companies might hold shares, in this context, also becomes a policy to bolster Russia’s 
infrastructural predominance in a sector of the global energy market which heavily depends on 
physical pipeline networks, and on which Russia has more economic resources to spend than 
Syria, Iraq, or Iran (despite US and EU sanctions regimes against Russia in other sectors).5 
 
4 Discussion organised by the PICREADI centre, attended by one of the authors. Moscow, 17 February 2017. 
5 For example, in 2017 Russia’s GDP stood at $1.7 trillion, compared to $564 billion for Iran and $212 billion 
for Iraq (World Bank n.d.; data for Syria were not available) 
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While Iran so far has signed agreements to invest in Syria communications, real estate, and 
agricultural sector, Russia is in a more advantageous position to target Syria’s energy sector 
(Sinjab, 2018). 
The interest of Russian energy companies in securing contracts in the Syria’s energy 
infrastructure as described in the previous section would serve to work towards Russia’s 
objective, as outlined by prime minster Medvedev (2016), of preserving Russia’s leading 
position in the global energy sector (FT, 2018). The preferential treatment of Russian 
companies promised by Syrian President Assad suggests that Russia’s investment in the 
consolidation of the Syrian regime is likely to pay off (RT, 2018). Statements from Russian 
government officials and companies suggest that Russian actors are eyeing investments in the 
phosphate sector, for instance (FT, 2019). The development of Syrian phosphate deposits has 
been contracted to Stroitransgaz Logistika, a company majority-owned by Putin confidant 
Gennady Timchenko (Mamedov and Shmeleva, 2019: 20). The likelihood of Russian 
investments in the Syrian oil and gas sector has also been underlined by President Assad 
himself: ‘We are not waiting for Western companies here, especially in the oil and gas sphere. 
I spoke about that with President Vladimir Putin in Sochi. We want Russian companies to work 
here, and we expect their fast market entry’ (RT, 2018). However, from a structural perspective, 
Russia is acting with regional players to form a Russian-led quasi-alliance that challenges US-
led energy alliances in the region. This transnationalisation of Russian energy interests is a 
reflection of the government’s reading of global energy trends: The Energy Research Institute 
of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in its ‘Global and Russian energy outlook to 2040’ – the 
authors of which have also been involved in the preparation of Russia’s official energy strategy 
to 2035 – has assessed key factors impacting Russia’s position as a leading energy provider. 
According to the authors, these factors are a) global energy consumption, b) sectoral shifts 
between the coal, gas, oil, nuclear, and renewable energy markets, and c) production levels of 
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competing energy-producing countries. Noting that ‘Iran’s large-scale emergence on global oil 
and gas markets’ (p. 3) is a long-term probability (pending the lifting of economic sanctions), 
they write: ‘The emergence of new gas suppliers could reduce prices on the European and 
Asian markets by $50–60 per thousand cubic metres and also replace significant volumes of 
Russian (70 bcm) and potential American exports (45 bcm). (p. 3)’. Iraq, the authors continue, 
may become a relevant ‘swing producer’ in OPEC, ‘providing Iraq with an exponential 
increase in revenues from exports, could also give the country extra muscle in the geopolitical 
arena’ (p. 87). Recognising that Iran and Iraq may become more important gas suppliers in the 
future, Russia’s transnationalisation logic thus becomes a strategy to exert influence over the 
energy market by securing Russia a direct say in regional pipeline plans that involve Iran, Iraq, 
and Syria (see also the discussion above regarding Iran’s and Qatar’s large gas reserves with 
relatively low gas production levels) (cf. also Kommersant, 2019). 
Against this background, Russia’s intervention in Syria might have stabilised its own 
relative predominance in regional energy affairs in the long-term. Acting as what Raphael and 
Stokes have called a ‘hegemonic stabiliser’ to secure logistical energy infrastructure that 
benefits potential Middle Eastern competitors becomes less of a paradox when viewed in light 
of global production trends. ‘After 2020’, the aforementioned report acknowledges, ‘Russian 
oil supplies will start to concede their market niche to Middle East market suppliers with their 
cheaper resources’, and that Russia will gradually recover its position only after 2035. Leaving 
aside future changes in global energy consumption and shifts towards non-fossil energy 
markets, Russian policies and strategies suggest that its government is interested in securing 
an advantageous position in the potential future arena for energy-producing countries to 
compete over prices and production levels – for which its military intervention in Syria may 
just have provided the groundwork. 
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Russia’s ‘systems-maintaining’ role, however, differs significantly from that of the US 
and is instead aimed at garnering influence and control of the system of resource supplies to 
core powers within the global, liberal economy, of which the US is the preponderant power but 
whereby Russia is one of the world’s key energy suppliers. Thus, in terms of energy supplies, 
while it may appear counter-intuitive for Russia to protect the Syrian government from 
rebelling forces – a government which has signed an agreement with Iran to build a gas 
pipeline, increasing supplies of gas to Europe and thus representing additional competition for 
Gazprom in European markets – Russian intervention ultimately pursues Russia’s own energy 
interests by securing it leverage and influence over future gas pipelines in the region. This 
includes influence over the proposed Islamic Pipeline which, if built and traversing through 
Syria with Assad in power, would also preclude the construction of the Qatari pipeline. For 
Russia, these dynamics would affect its own future gas exports to Europe given that, as noted 
above, Iran and Qatar have the world’s second and third largest proved gas reserves yet 
currently lag behind both the US and Russia in terms of levels of gas production. 
Thus, while Russia itself exhibits a similar dual logic that, on the one hand, aims to 
benefit what it would consider as core players that attempt to counterbalance US hegemony in 
the Middle East (for instance, Iran, as well as Syria), on the other hand, as a key global energy 
supplier, Russia has its own national interests at heart. In this light, Russia’s dual logic is 
underpinned by more direct benefits that it pursues through military intervention (e.g., the 
potential to realise opportunities in Syria’s oil and gas industries) when compared to the US’ 
dual logic, whereby even if the US TNCs do not directly benefit from US intervention, the US 
nevertheless benefits from greater supplies of resources to all core industrial powers within the 
global capitalist system in which the US remains the preponderant economic power.  
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Russia’s support for general Haftar in the Libyan conflict supports this conclusion, as 
Russian companies like Rosneft have already signed contracts for future oil exploration 
(Neftegaz, 2017). Examining to what extent a ‘dual logic’ applies in other conflicts like Libya 
could be the subject of future research, yet identifying important structural differences to the 
Syrian case (such as the absence of regional energy competitors in Libya) are beyond the scope 
of this paper. Finally, the volatile nature of the energy price market and the growing political 
leverage of OPEC members such as Saudi Arabia are centrifugal forces that pull at Russia’s 
claim to be a hegemonic stabiliser on the energy market. This has been made even clearer with 
the Saudi-Russian oil price war of March 2020.  
Conclusion  
This article posits that, similar to what Stokes (2007) has argued regarding US 
intervention in Iraq, Russia exhibits a distinct dual logic that underpins its intervention in Syria, 
a logic that has a transnational aspect (securing the interests of states not aligned to the US-led 
liberal order), while simultaneously placing Russia’s interests at the core of its intervention. 
We have argued that Russia has not primarily intervened in Syria to secure the construction of 
the Islamic Pipeline. Instead, by targeting anti-Assad forces wherever their strongholds were, 
Russia’s military activities in Syria are aimed at the survival of the Assad regime and further 
regime consolidation in Syria. This is an observation that has also been made by analysts 
focusing on the instrumental value of Russia’s Syria intervention for Russian foreign policy 
identity at a time of difficult Russian-Western relations. 
However, while Russian intervention has primarily focused on regime consolidation, 
economic factors – including the proposed gas pipelines – should be considered. Indeed, 
Russian intervention will secure the Kremlin a crucial level of influence and leverage when 
considering natural resource extraction, transportation and exportation – especially in gas – in 
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the Middle East. This is particularly relevant with regard to any proposed future gas pipelines 
traversing Syria that will increase the supply of gas to lucrative EU markets, of which Russia 
is a leading supplier. Statements of intent on the part of companies, as well as Russian and 
Syrian state actors, indicate that short-term rewards for Russia’s defence of the Assad regime 
are likely to be contracts for Russian companies in Syria.  
Regardless of the speculative nature of the pipeline project, Russia’s continued ties to 
Syrian state structures are also likely to secure it leverage power in the long-term over any 
future energy negotiations that link Syria and Iran. The sponsorship of (future) infrastructure 
projects, together with the continued presence of Russian (irregular) forces on the ground, 
constitutes a combination of economic and military policies to pacify potential competitors by 
contributing to political and territorial consolidation and thus to an environment conducive to 
new investment opportunities. Here, Russian policies serve to further the perception of a 
‘hegemonic stabiliser’ (Raphael and Stokes, 2011: 915). In addition, Russia’s Syria campaign 
has been analysed here as part of a long-term process to transnationalise Russian energy 
interests, where its forcible contribution to political consolidation can give Russia a structural 
advantage over the definition of regional energy interconnections at the same time – regardless 
of the political instability (Iraq, Syria) or financial uncertainties (Iran in a troubled sanctions 
environment) of some of its partner countries. 
Finally, the ‘dual logic’ lens employed in the analysis can provide insights into Russian 
intervention in other theatres of combat such as Libya. However, a more detailed analysis of 
the core themes presented in this article – including the application of the ‘dual logic’ concept 
– requires more empirical testing not only in the Syrian case looking forward, where it appears 
that Russia has long-term plans to deepen its political and economic influence in the country, 
but also in other cases where the framework presented in this article may provide utility in 
30 
 
understanding Russia’s foreign policy decisions. This article has also primarily focused on the 
reasons for Russia’s decision to militarily intervene in Syria. As such, Russia’s changing 
relationships with other keys states (including Qatar and Saudi Arabia) since it has conducted 
its military campaign in Syria do not fit the scope of this article. Russia’s relationship with 
Qatar is a case in point, which, while historically turbulent, has improved in recent years (for 
example, see Frolovskiy, 2019). These issues may impact future energy developments in the 
Middle East more generally, which makes them a promising area for further research.  
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APPENDIX 1. Note on Airwars data.  
The data are taken from Airwars (February 2018) and focus on the period between September 
2015 and April 2016. This represents the period when Russia initiated its airstrike campaign in 
Syria and is one of the most intensive periods of Russian airstrikes in the country. Airwars 
40 
 
records civilian casualties from both ‘Allied’ airstrikes and Russian airstrikes. The data used 
in this article record only airstrikes where at least one civilian casualty has been recorded. 
Airwars provides data that ranks reports of civilian causalities as ‘weak’ (only a single source 
available as evidence) and ‘fair’ (with a reasonable level of public reporting from at least two 
generally credible sources). This article uses only incidents recorded with a ‘fair’ level of 
reporting. While it is true that the data in this article will under-report the number of Russian 
airstrikes, the data nevertheless show trends with regard to the intensity of airstrikes in 
particular areas of Syria. 
 
APPENDIX 2. Note on ACLED’s data. 
ACLED codes the data as “Air/drone strike”. At times, the data stipulate that it is difficult to 
ascertain if attacks were conducted by the Russian or Syrian military (coded as ‘Allied Syrian 
and/or Russian Forces’). Only governorates with at least 15 air/drone strikes are included in 
Figure 4. 
 
 
 
